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Abstract. This paper deals with the merger of the two lightweight stream ciphers – A5/1 
and Trivium. The idea is to make the key stream generation more secure and to remove 
the attacks of the individual algorithms. The bits generated by the Trivium cipher 
(output) will act as the input of the A5/1 cipher. The registers used in the A5/1 cipher 
will be filled by the output bits of the Trivium cipher. The three registers will then be 
connected to generate an output which will be our required key stream.  
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1 Introduction 
Lightweight stream ciphers are used to reach high levels of security using only a small 
computing power. Stream encryption is the encryption of each letter one by one followed by 
the changing the encryption key after each letter. Lightweight stream ciphers have the 
advantage of having low cost hardware implementations as they have high throughput and 
low complexity. The idea is to come up with a lightweight stream cipher algorithm by 
modifying and merging existing cipher algorithms to make it secure to the attacks the stream 
ciphers were originally vulnerable to.Here, we are merging and making changes in Trivium 
and A5/1 algorithm to build a new lightweight stream cipher COZMO. In section 1.1 and 1.2 
we are explaining how Trivium and A5/1 work. In section 2, we are explaining the working of 
COZMO. Then in section 3, we are discussing the statistical results in detail. Section 4 
contains the conclusion of the proposal.  
 
Background: 
1.1 Understanding the working of Trivium: 
Trivium generates up to 264 bits of key stream from an 80 bit secret key and an 80 bit 
initialization vector (IV). First the internal state of the cipher is initialised using the key and 
the IV. Then the state is updated repeatedly to generate the key stream bits. It consists of 3 
interconnected non-linear feedback shift registers. The length of the registers are 93, 84 and 
111 bits, respectively.Initialisation requires 1152 steps of the clocking before key stream is 
generated. There are XOR gates to XOR the ouputs we get from the various registers which is 
again fed back to the first one. The 91 and 92 bits are ANDed and used to give the feedback to 
the 94th bit. The 175 and 176 bits are ANDed and used to give the feedback to the 178th bit. 
The 286 and 287 bits are ANDed and used to give feedback to the 288th bit. And the 288th bit 
is giving back the feedback to the 1st bit. [1],[5], 
 
Fig. 1. Trivium 
Mathematical structure 
If we denote the internal state bits of the Trivium Model algorithm at time t as  
z(t)=(z1(t),z2(t), ... ,z3n3 (t)), then the internal bits from time t to time t+ 1 can be expressed as 
follows 
   z(t + 1) =A . z(t) +b(t)    (1) 
Where A = (aij)3n3 x 3n3 is the state-transition matrix of the algorithm with size 3n3 x 3n3 
 
    1, i =1, j= 3u2, 3u5, 3n2 
1, i =3n1 +1, j= 3u1, 3u4 
aij =   1, i =3n2 +1, j= 3u3, 3u6  (2) 
1,  1<i<=3n3, j =I - 1  
0,  otherwise 
b(t)=(bi(t))3n3 is the nonlinear segment of the algorithm, which is treated as the vectors of bits 
  
    z3n3-2(t) . z3n3-1(t),  i= 1  
bi(t) =  z3n1-2(t) . z3n1-1(t), i= 3n1 + 1  (3) 
z3n2-2(t) . z3n2-1(t),  i= 3n2 + 1  
0,    otherwise 
  
 
 
1.2 Understanding the working of A5/1: 
A5/1 uses 3 shift registers of 19, 22 and 23 bits respectively. We have a 64 bit key and we’ll 
load it in the three registers. Then we’ll do some process to generate as many bits as we want 
to and we’ll use those bits as the key stream and XOR it with the plain text to encrypt and the 
cipher text to decrypt. There is a majority vote function which will take 3 bits and find the 
majority of them. The three shift registers are loaded with the 64 bit key. There are three 
special positions in the registers – 8, 10 and 10 respectively. Take the majority of these three 
bits and check which of the registers are in majority. If register 1 is in majority then take the 
13th, 16th, 17th and 18th bit and XOR them. If register 2 is in majority then XOR the bits in the 
20th and 21st position. If register 3 is in majority then XOR the bits in the 7th, 20th, 21st and 
22nd position. Only shift the XORed bits to the first position of the registers belonging in 
majority. The register which is not in majority will remain untouched. Then we have to XOR 
the bits in the last position of the registers and that is our required key stream bit. Repeating 
this process over and over again will give us our key stream. [2],[10] 
 
 
Fig. 2. A5/1 
2 Proposed Methodology 
The idea is to make the key stream even more secure by merging the two algorithms together. 
The Trivium cipher is initialised with a key and initialization vector and the A5/1 cipher is 
initialised with all 0’s. First we will be generating a key stream using the Trivium algorithm. 
The generated key stream bits will be used as the input for the A5/1 cipher. There will be a 
clocking of 1216 (1152+64) cycles before the key stream starts getting generated. Let the 
three registers be called register A, B and C respectively. First we XOR the selected position 
bits in all the registers. For the first register A, the selected positions are the 13 th, 16th and 
17thand 18th bits. For the second register B, the selected positions are the 20th and 21st bits. For 
the third register C, the selected positions are the 7th, 20th, 21st and 22nd bits. Next we check 
the majority function and find the two registers that are in majority. Next,we shift the bit in 
the last position to the first position by using right shift by one place only for the registers in 
majority. Once that is done, we will use the XOR bits. If register A is in majority and B isn’t 
then discard the XORed bit from register A. Since register C is in majority, the XORed bit of 
register B will replace the bit in the first position of register C. Register A which is also in 
majority will have its first bit replaced by the XORed bit of the register C which is XORed 
with the bit generated by Trivium. The final key stream is the XOR of the three bits in the last 
positions of the three registers. 
2.1 Algorithm: 
Step 1: 
Initialise all the bits of the Trivium cipher with a key 
and an initialisation vector. 
Initialise all the bits of A5/1 cipher with 0. 
Step 2: 
Clock 1216 (1152+64) cycles before generating the first 
key stream. Then generate key stream using Trivium. This 
key stream will be used as the input bits for A5/1.  
Step 3: 
XOR the 13th, 16th, 17th and 18th bits in register A. XOR 
the 20th and 21st bits in register B. XOR the 7th, 20th, 21t 
and 22nd bits in register C.  
Step 4: 
Check the majority function and find the resisters that 
are in majority  
Step 5: 
For the registers in majority, right shift the bits by 
one place and replace the first bit of thregister with 
the XORed bit (r0 byp3, r19 by p1, r41 by p2). 
Step 6: 
Discard the XORed bit for the registers not in majority.   
Step 7: 
XOR the bits in the last position the registers. 
Step 8: 
Repeat steps 4-7. 
 
  
Fig. 3. COZMO 
 
2.3 Pseudo Code: 
Key = (K1, . . . , K80) 
IV = (IV1, . . . , IV80) 
(s1, s2, . . . , s93) ← (K1, . . . , K80, 0, . . . , 0)  
(s94, s95, . . . , s177) ← (IV1, . . . , IV80, 0, . . . , 
0) 
(s178, s279, . . . , s288) ← (0, . . . , 0, 1, 1, 1) 
Register A: 
 (r0, r2, . . . , r18) ← (0,0, . . . , 0) 
Register B: 
 (r19, r20, . . . , r40) ← (0,0, . . . , 0) 
Register C: 
 (r41, r43, . . . , r63) ← (0,0, . . . , 0) 
Operations: 
⊕ : bit-wise exclusive OR  
& : bit-wise AND 
Variables: 
zi : the ith bit generated by trivium. 
l : r8 bit of register A 
M  : r29 bit of register B 
N : r51 bit of register C 
ti : The keystream bit generated at the ith step. 
Function: 
maj(L, M, N) = (L&M) ⊕ (M&N) ⊕ (L&N) 
A complete description is given by the following pseudo-code: 
For i = 1 to N do 
 ti ←  r18⊕ r40⊕ r63 
 p1 ←  r13⊕ r16⊕ r17 ⊕ r18 
 p2 ←  r39⊕ r40 
 p3  ← r48⊕ r61⊕ r62⊕ r63⊕zi 
 Ifs8equal to maj(L, M, N) Then 
  (r0,r1, r2, . . . , r18) ← (p3, r0, . . . , r17) 
 ElseIf s29 equal to maj(L, M, N) Then 
  (r19,r20,  . . . , r40) ← (p1, r19, . . . , r39) 
 ElseIfs52equal to maj(L, M, N) Then 
  (r41,r42,  . . . , r63) ← (p2, r41, . . . , r62) 
 EndIf 
End for 
 
3 Results and Discussion 
To test the randomness property of the key bit generator following statistical tests were 
conducted using the NIST Statistical Test Suite.[17] 
Frequency Test: The test was conducted to check if the sequence is truly random. 
Randomness of the sequence is determined by the number of ones and zeros in the sequence, 
which is expected to be approximately equal for a truly random sequence.  
Cumulative Sums Test: The focus of this test is the maximal excursion from zeroof the 
cumulative sum of the partial sequences defined by the cumulative sum of adjusted (-1, +1) 
digits in the sequence. For a random sequence, the cumulative sum of the partial sequences 
should be near zero.  
Approximate Entropy Test: The focus of this test is the frequency of each and every 
overlapping m-bit pattern. The purpose of the test is to compare the frequency of overlapping 
blocks of twoconsecutive/adjacent lengths (m and m+1) against the expected result for a 
random sequence. 
Linear Complexity: This test is performed to determine whether or not the sequence is 
complex enough to be considered random. Random sequences are characterized by a longer 
feedback register. 
Serial Test: The purpose of this test is to determine whether the number of occurrences of the 
2m m-bit overlapping patterns is approximately the same as would be expected for a random 
sequence.  
Longest Runs of Ones: The purpose of this test is to determine whether the length of the 
longest run of ones within the tested sequence is consistent with the length of the longest run 
of ones that would be expected in a random sequence.  
Runs Test: The runs test is conducted to determine whether the number of runs of ones and 
zeros of various lengths is as expected for a random sequence. In particular, this test 
determines whether the oscillation between such substrings is too fast or too slow. 
From the results of the tests tabulated below we can conclude that at 1% level of significance 
null hypothesis is accepted since the p-values are greater than 0.01. In other words, the data 
has passed all the above-mentioned tests proving randomness property of the key bit 
generator. 
 
Statistical Test p- value Success/failure 
Frequency 0.534146 Success 
Cumulative Sums P1-0.122325 
P2-0.350485 
Success 
Approximate Entropy 0.004301 Success 
Linear Complexity 0.213309 Success 
Serial P1-0.004301  
P2- 0.017912 
Success 
Longest Run of Ones 0.350485 Success 
Runs 0.911413 Success 
Table 1: The Results of Statistical Analysis for A5/1 
 
Statistical Test p- value Success/failure 
Frequency 0.534146 Success 
Cumulative Sums P1- 0.213309 
P2- 0.350485 
Success 
Approximate Entropy 0.534146 Success 
Linear Complexity 0.035174 Success 
Serial P1- 0.911413 
P2- 0.534146 
Success 
Longest Run of Ones 0.739918 Success 
Runs 0.350485 Success 
Table 2: The Results of Statistical Analysis for Trivium 
  
Statistical Test p- value Success/failure 
Frequency 0.911413 Success 
Cumulative Sums P1-0.991468 
P2-0.739918 
Success 
Approximate Entropy 0.350485 Success 
Linear Complexity 0.066882 Success 
Serial P1-0.213309 
P2-0.534146 
Success 
Longest Run of Ones 0.534146 Success 
Runs 0.122325 Success 
Table 3: The Results of Statistical Analysis for COZMO 
 
 
4 Conclusion 
 We want to propose a new lightweight stream cipher[7] because of their higher speed, 
efficiency and its easy implementations on applications which require plain texts of unknown 
length. In this paper we merged and made some changes to the algorithms of two already 
existing lightweight stream ciphers – Trivium and A5/1 and proposed a new lightweight 
stream cipher with good key randomness as key randomness is a major issue is stream 
ciphers. The generated key stream is more secure compared to the key streams generated by 
the individual ciphers. Our algorithm produces sequences which are stronger in statistical 
properties than the A5/1 and Trivium. The implementation of this algorithm is also very 
feasible and easy to put to use.   
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